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I. INTRODUCTION
The participants in the [New Jersey] procedure [for compulsory
medication] are mental health professionals, rather than judges
who have doffed their black robes and donned white coats.
Rennie v. Klein 1

* Professor and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School of
Law. The author is grateful for the criticisms and suggestions offered, in response to an earlier draft
of this article, by Professors Michael Saks, Joseph Sanders, Michael Risinger, Gary Edmond,
Edward Cheng, and Andrew Jurs; all errors, of course, remain the responsibility of the author.
1. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 851 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
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Judge Alex Kozinski . . . interpreted Daubert as creating a brave
new world in which trial court judges donned white coats and were
forced to play scientist.
David L. Faigman & John Monahan 2
In the ongoing discourse concerning admissibility of scientific expertise
in the courtroom, the question of whether post-Daubert trial judges should
become “amateur” scientists 3 (no one is suggesting an abdication of the
judicial role 4 ) is meant to raise concerns about the capacity of judges to
make scientific judgments. My focus is on another apparent trend at the
intersection of the fields of evidentiary standards for expert admissibility and
professional responsibility, namely the eagerness to place more ethical
responsibilities on lawyers to vet their proffered expertise to ensure its
reliability. In terms of the extant clothing metaphors, lawyers are now
seemingly asked to don both black robes and white lab coats. 5
My reservations about this trend are not only based on its troubling
implications for the lawyer’s duty as a zealous advocate, which already has
obvious limitations (because of lawyers’ conflicting duties to the court), but
are also based on the problematic aspects of many reliability
determinations. 6 I take seriously Judge Kozinski’s concern, in Daubert on
remand, that “scientists often have vigorous and sincere disagreements as to
what research methodology is proper, what should be accepted as sufficient
proof for the existence of a ‘fact,’ and whether information derived by a
particular method can tell us anything useful about the subject under study.” 7
The fact that judges, typically untrained in science, need to “resolve
disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters
squarely within their expertise,” 8 a “daunting task,” 9 seems to suggest that
lawyers could too. But judges do not always agree on the admissibility of
2. David L. Faigman & John Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law’s
Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 631, 636 (2005).
3. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 does not impose on judges “either the
obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists”).
4. Indeed, it was Frye-regime judges who might have been thought to abdicate judicial decision
making to technical experts, but not post-Daubert, gatekeeping judges. See Faigman & Monahan,
supra note 2, at 636 (suggesting that the Frye test, namely “whether the field accepted the proffered
knowledge,” was more deferential to scientists than the Daubert test, whereby “judges have brought
greater scrutiny to bear on proffered expertise”).
5. See infra notes 12–20 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying note 7.
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1315.
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expertise, and discerning reliability has proved to be controversial. 10 To
expect attorneys—and this is what the proponents of a duty to vet experts
expect—to do sufficient scientific research to create their own reliability
controversy, make a determination as to the ultimate reliability of their own
experts, and face ethical sanctions if they err is going too far. While it is
easy to choose examples that support a compelling argument for a
responsibility to vet experts, the complexity of the scientific enterprise, in
terms of its diverse methodologies, probabilistic conclusions, and genuine
scientific disagreements, counsels against a broad, new ethical duty. Indeed,
some of the arguments for that new duty seem to rest on unrealistic
assumptions about science and the ease with which reliability determinations
can be made. Moreover, a broad duty to vet experts would represent a
serious and problematic departure from the lawyer’s role as an advocate.
At the outset, however, I should acknowledge that the notion of
imposing a duty to vet experts has tremendous appeal and seems to rest on
the convergence of three other trends or phenomena. 11 First, concerns over
prosecutorial misuse of expert testimony are growing and easily justified:
Some of the most disturbing revelations that emerged from the
DNA exonerations . . . in the 1990s concern the misconduct of
prosecutors. In Actual Innocence, [which examined] sixty-two . . .
DNA exonerations secured through Cardozo Law School’s
Innocence Project[, a] . . . significant contributor to these
miscarriages of justice was the misuse of expert testimony. A third
of these cases involved “tainted or fraudulent science” . . . .
The prosecutorial misconduct revealed in the exoneration cases,
however, is not a new phenomenon . . . [which suggests] that the

10. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF
SCIENCE IN LAW 15–47 (2006) (offering examples of trial judges whose reliability determinations
were reversed on appeal); Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of
Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6–7 (2009).
The Daubert ruling is far from unambiguous . . . and its articulation of the idea of
evidentiary reliability is far from transparent . . . . The Joiner ruling . . . creates further
concerns about the blurring of questions of admissibility with questions of the weight or
the sufficiency of evidence; the Kumho Tire ruling finally acknowledges that what really
matters is . . . whether [expert testimony, scientific or otherwise,] is reliable—yet it seems
to leave the tricky stuff to courts’ discretion. And the revised [Federal] Rule [of
Evidence] 702, with its emphatic repetition of “reliable,” “reliably,” and “sufficient,” is
apt to leave one doubtful whether any verbal formula, by itself, could make it possible to
determine whether the data on which a scientific witness bases his opinion are sufficient,
or whether his methods are reliable.
Id.
11. See infra notes 12–20 and accompanying text.
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problem is systemic rather than episodic. 12
Giannelli and McMunigal provide ample support for, and frightening
examples of, that proposition. 13 They conclude that a gatekeeping role for
prosecutors should be added to ABA Model Rule 3.8, requiring, as a
precondition to offering scientific evidence, a “good faith and reasonable
belief that the evidence (1) is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) is the product of reliable
application of such principles and methods to the facts of the case.” 14 That
is, the prosecutor should perform, in advance, the admissibility
determination typically performed by a trial judge in a Daubert hearing.
Second, and closely related to the concerns over prosecutors’ use of
unreliable forensic science, there is a growing concern that the “existing
rules of admissibility, judicial discretions, jury directions, limitations placed
on the use of evidence, and the availability of review have not been used in
ways that might have prevented serious and continuing problems.” 15 In his
appeal to Canadian courts to develop a strong Daubert-type standard, the
problems that Gary Edmond had in mind are related to prosecutors’ use of
evidence based in forensic science and medicine, fields “historically
insulated from more mainstream scientific and biomedical research;” this
suggests the need for “an explicit reliability standard [to be imposed] on
expert evidence adduced by the state.” 16
The basic contention is that courts should not admit expert evidence
adduced by the prosecution unless there are good grounds for
believing that the evidence is reliable. Expressed more precisely,
judges should [require] that evidence is demonstrably reliable . . . .
In practice, the state would be expected to undertake some kind of
empirical testing to ascertain whether the techniques and theories
relied on by forensic scientists, pathologists, and technicians are
valid and accurate. 17
Because courts throughout the common-law jurisdictions do not seem to
12. Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1493–94 (2007) (citing BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000)).
13. See Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 12, at 1495–1513.
14. Id. at 1535–36 (referring to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007)). The
proposed addition to Model Rule 3.8 tracks the prerequisites for admissibility in Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. Id.
15. See Gary Edmond, Pathological Science? Demonstrable Reliability and Expert Forensic
Pathology Evidence, at 17, available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/
policy_research/pdf/Edmond_Paper.pdf (published in PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY AND THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 96–149 (K. Roach ed., 2008)); see also Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 12, at
1531–32.
16. See Edmond, supra note 15, at 1, 3.
17. Id. at 1–2.
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“have subjected institutionalized forensic science and medicine to
particularly stringent tests of accountability,” and even though the U.S.
federal courts’ “Daubert criteria provide neither an accurate (or even
coherent) characterization of science, medicine, and expertise, nor an
especially neat solution to issues of reliability” for “impecunious [criminal]
defendants (or plaintiffs),” an onerous application of “all four of the Daubert
criteria” would “seem to be a reasonable requisite for [prosecutorial use of]
forensic science and medical evidence.” 18 Although Edmond does not
recommend a higher ethical standard for Canadian prosecutors (or other
attorneys), his proposal for reform places additional responsibilities on
prosecutors to test the types of expertise they typically use. 19
The third phenomenon contributing to the appeal of imposing a duty to
vet experts, due in part to revelations of junk forensic science, is the
tendency to idealize science and the “scientific method” as relatively
uncomplicated sources of knowledge that could and should be used to
stabilize the interpretive, rhetorical, social, and institutional instabilities of
legal contexts. However, such an idealization downplays or eclipses the
interpretive, rhetorical, social, and institutional aspects of science itself. 20
As I will explain below, some of the proposals to require that lawyers vet
experts seem to assume that assessing the reliability of an expert is simply a
matter of checking one’s expert’s testimony against the presumably stable
knowledge-base of the scientific establishment. Or, in the case of certain
types of forensic “science,” assessment is simply a matter of recognizing
that there is no research validating their reliability.
In the face of the convergence of these trends—prosecutorial
misconduct, seemingly weak judicial control, and a romanticized vision of
science for law—some obvious objections arise to my argument that an
ethical duty to vet expertise is problematic because of both the complexity of
reliability determinations and the role of an advocate.
First, because a prosecutor’s role as a minister of justice is distinct from
the roles of criminal defense counsel and civil advocates, an ethical rule for
prosecutors to vet expertise would not affect the goals of advocacy. 21 Thus,
18. Id. at 14, 36, 38. That is, Edmond distinguishes between the prosecution and the defense (the
“demonstrably reliable” requirement “should only apply . . . to evidence adduced by the
prosecution”) . . . and between the criminal and civil litigation contexts (“plaintiffs, like criminal
defendants, are not always in a position to produce demonstrably reliable evidence”). Id. at 32–33.
19. Id. at 1–2.
20. See generally CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 10 (arguing that judicial failure to
acknowledge the pragmatic aspects of science results in bad admissibility determinations, i.e.,
sometimes keeping out good science and sometimes allowing bad science into court).
21. See David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/367/.put.
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my only argument against such a rule is that reliability determinations can be
complex due to the uncertainties of science. However, critics of the
weaknesses of forensic science point out that some types of purported
expertise are so easily discredited that a prosecutor should not introduce
them (even if courts find them admissible). 22 I agree, but there are several
options to deal with that problem:
(a) Because the current rule that allows attorneys to present evidence as
long as it is not known to be false “reflects an adversarial paradigm,”
Giannelli and McMunigal (and others) propose an ethical rule that “would
bar a prosecutor from offering scientific evidence unless she knows it is
sound.” 23
(b) Encourage judges to develop “the formal expectation that the
prosecution can only adduce expert evidence if it is shown to be reliable.” 24
“If wrongful convictions across the common-law world have demonstrated
anything, it is that liberal admissibility standards and judicial complacency
have enabled prosecutors to use (and continue to rely upon) expert evidence
that is not reliable.” 25 Daubert was supposed to remedy such problems, but
its “demanding standards . . . have yet to be fully implemented in criminal
litigation.” 26
(c) Rely on the current ethical framework to police prosecutorial misuse
of unreliable evidence—which does not seem to be working.
Given the persistent problems of prosecutorial use of forensic science, it
would be naïve to suggest that the solution is the already-established
Daubert regime or the current ethical rules, which makes the establishment
of a new ethical rule for prosecutors seem unavoidable. Moreover, urgent
concerns over fairness and justice in criminal law would seem to eclipse any
theoretical concerns over the uncertainties of science that might make it
difficult for prosecutors to know the soundness of their expertise. 27 On the
Prosecutors aren’t supposed to win at all costs. In a time-honored formula, their job is to
seek justice, not victory . . . . [T]his stark difference between the prosecutor’s mission
and the mission other advocates are assigned in the adversary system is obvious: the
criminal justice system would be a travesty if a prosecutor, holding years of someone’s
life in her hands, cared about nothing but notching another victory.
Id. at 8–9.
22. See Giannelli & McMunigan, supra note 12, at 1493 n.1.
23. See id. at 1533, 1535; Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the
Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1439 (2007); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the
Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2007).
24. See Edmond, supra note 15, at 30–31 (recommending that the Canadian Supreme Court
explain “how indicia of reliability, like those from Daubert and elsewhere, should be weighted and
applied”).
25. Id.
26. Giannelli & McMunigal, supra note 12, at 1531.
27. Giannelli and McMunigal are mildly critical of Professor Moriarty’s proposal that
prosecutors not use evidence known (or which should be known) to be unreliable because “what is
or is not reliable is subject to debate,” and it “would be difficult to fault a prosecutor who used
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other hand, some types of expertise are more difficult to evaluate, such that a
general ethical rule requiring prosecutors only to offer evidence that they know
is sound could be difficult to enforce. But the force of these objections—that
prosecutors need policing, that much of the questionable forensic science is not
that complicated, and that life and liberty are at stake—combine to make an
exception (to my argument) for prosecutors reasonable, necessary, and well
worth the risk that, in rare criminal cases (i.e., trials involving highly
complicated expertise), the rule will be difficult to apply and enforce. In any
event, my argument in this Article is against imposing a general duty on all
attorneys to vet their expertise.
But there is another obvious objection to my argument, without regard for
the need for an exception to address prosecutorial misuse of purportedly
scientific evidence—namely, whether it really is an onerous burden on attorneys
to confirm the reliability of their expertise. I should emphasize that my
argument is not based on any presumed inability of attorneys to understand
complex science or on any notion of scientific illiteracy. Rather, I want to
emphasize the instabilities and uncertainties of expertise itself and base my
argument on the phenomenon of serious disagreements among experts as to the
reliability of certain scientific arguments. While it is obviously necessary for
judges and juries to make difficult evaluations, I balk at the notion that such
evaluations should always be made in advance of the trial by advocates. I say
“always” because I recognize instances where attorneys should withhold
frivolous evidence. My argument is simply that we should not construct a
general rule based on such examples. Rather, we should hesitate to modify
radically the advocate’s role, primarily because of the many counter-examples
where the reliability of the science is not so easily discernable.
In Section II below, I summarize the controversy over the ethical duties of a
lawyer with respect to proffered expertise, including (i) the proposal requiring
all attorneys to vet the reliability of their experts and (ii) the compelling
argument for such a duty on the part of prosecutors in light of the crisis in
criminal forensics. I argue, in Section III, that the proposal for a general duty is
based on uncomplicated hypotheticals and an oversimplified view of science. In
Section IV, I consider the implications of proposals to vet experts for the
lawyer’s role as advocate. I conclude, in Section V, that while numerous

[weak] evidence carefully—that is, ensuring that the jury understood its limitations.” Id. at 1535
n.246. Thus, they concede the controversy over “reliability” and impliedly the controversial nature
of their own proposed rule. In response to commentators who argue that the “principles and
methods of science are often uncertain and in a state of flux,” they recognize the possibility that we
may need a less demanding duty on prosecutors to only confirm that their expertise is based on facts
and data, but not “the product of reliable principles and methods.” Id. at 1536 n.248.
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limitations on advocacy are justified, a broad duty to pre-judge the validity of
proffered expertise is not.
II. DISCOURSES OF ADMISSIBILITY
[T]o some extent the very nature of science can be characterized as
uncertain, because scientific theories are either underdeterminative,
or are never fully consistent with all the available evidence.
Though the nature and degree of uncertainties may vary depending
upon the given situation, . . . much of scientific research can be
characterized as “uncertain” . . . .
Stephanie Tai 28
In the scholarly discourse concerning health and environmental
regulation, scientific uncertainty is a major theme—debates persist about
whether the evidence to support a regulation is too uncertain or about
acceptable levels of uncertainty. 29 Inevitable uncertainties are, however, not
so prominent in the scholarly discourse concerning scientific expertise in the
courtroom. Perhaps because regulation is prospective, and because a
question about whether a particular chemical is harmful does not require a
yes or no answer—“doubt may preclude a decision” 30 —the regulatory arena
is unlike retrospective litigation where a decision about, for example,
whether a workplace chemical caused harm is required. 31 On the other
hand, if a judge or jury does not find that such a tort plaintiff met his or her
burden of proof, that decision is not necessarily a “no” answer—the
chemical may have caused the harm, but the evidence was insufficient, or
perhaps too uncertain, to support a verdict. 32 And yet, in the post-Daubert
era, characterized by judicial gatekeeping and concerns over “junk science”
in the courtroom, decisions are made regularly (in so-called Daubert pretrial hearings or Frye hearings in those states that have not adopted Daubert
standards) concerning the adequacy of proposed scientific experts and their

28. Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial Decisions on
Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 676 (2009). Scientific theories are
considered underdetermined if there is a rival theory that is consistent with the evidence. See
generally RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS 237–40 (1999) (describing how scientific
communities put forth some theories “as true, correct, accepted, the best available, etc.” even though
such theories are underdetermined).
29. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural
Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2007) (uncertainty is “the unifying hallmark”
of environmental regulation).
30. Alyson Flourney, Legislation Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 327, 386–87 (1999).
31. See, e.g., Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398, 404 (Cal. 1999).
32. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 862 (Ct. App. 2004).
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testimony. 33 Such decisions involve a “yes” or “no” answer, and any
substantial doubt on the part of the gatekeeping judge, perhaps due to
substantial uncertainty in the science underlying the expert’s testimony, will
lead to a “no.” 34 Judges, unlike regulators, do not wait for more studies or
for reductions of uncertainty levels before taking action.
Despite the doubts raised in Daubert by Justice Rehnquist’s dissent 35
concerning the capacity of judges to make scientific judgments, they do and
must in the post-Daubert gatekeeping regime. 36 All the talk of “junk
science” in the decades leading up to Daubert, together with the implied
charge in Daubert to root out junk scientists from the courtroom, resulted in
an unfortunate tendency to characterize scientific disagreements between
two experts as the result of one of them being a charlatan and the other
delivering scientific truth. Moreover, despite the reference to “shaky”
scientific evidence in Daubert, 37 without the slightest suggestion that the
attorneys proffering such evidence were unethical, the notion that lawyers
have a duty to evaluate the validity of their proffered expertise has been
lurking in post-Daubert scholarly discourse. 38 The recent phenomenon of a
crisis in forensic science has revived that notion, particularly with regard to a
higher duty on the part of prosecutors to “voluntarily refrain from using
potentially unreliable evidence.” 39 Moreover, the image of any attorney
proffering expert testimony that the attorney suspects is false is powerful,
making the duty to stop such behavior appear common-sensical and
rendering counter-intuitive the ethical rules that actually allow such evidence
to be presented. While there may be difficulties associated with evaluations
of scientific reliability on the part of lawyers, the fact that judges do and
must perform such evaluations gives a certain credence to the task. 40 Thus,
the difficulties of scientific evaluation have been eclipsed by debates over
whether the ethical rules currently require attorneys to evaluate the
reliability of their proffered expertise 41 or whether ethical reforms are

33. See 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.02[3] (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN].
34. See generally id.
35. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (Rehnquist J., dissenting)
(doubting the capacity of trial judges to become amateur scientists).
36. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at § 702.02[3].
37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (referring to “shaky but admissible evidence,” appropriately
attacked by “contrary evidence” or “[v]igorous cross-examination”).
38. See generally Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys,
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 421 (2001) (considering the question, “What are the legal and ethical
responsibilities of attorneys when offering scientific expert evidence to courts?”).
39. Moriarty, supra note 23, at 24.
40. Id. at 23.
41. Id.
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needed to establish such a requirement. 42
I hope to show that the trend toward greater ethical duties on the part of
lawyers to “vet” their experts is based on an unrealistic view of the scientific
enterprise and of the role of advocates. While I agree that prosecutors have
higher duties than lawyer-advocates in the fields of civil litigation and
criminal defense, to say that the duties of every lawyer include, or should
include, a duty to evaluate the scientific reliability of proffered expertise is
more problematic that it seems.
A. The Ongoing Debate
A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not
preclude its presentation to the trier of fact.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 43
The ethical rules regarding presentation of evidence are familiar:
lawyers cannot present evidence known to be false and may refuse to offer
evidence reasonably believed to be false—the latter aphorism confirms,
indirectly, that evidence reasonably believed to be false can indeed be
offered. 44 At this point, the debate begins, and exceptions begin to develop.
First, knowledge of falsity can be inferred from the circumstances. 45 So,
unlike the Virginia interpretation of the prohibition against knowingly
presenting false testimony, which requires that the witness acknowledge the
fraud 46 —perhaps a rarity—an attorney may be deemed to have actual
knowledge of falsity—that is, second-guessed—when that falsity is obvious
to everyone else. Second, the belief, not knowledge, that evidence is false
must be reasonable—if the lawyer has a very strong belief in falsity,
whatever doubt there is may not qualify as “genuine and reasonable.” 47
Thus, a “strategic” belief in falsity may be transformed into actual
knowledge. Third, there is the suggestion that knowledge of falsity can be
imputed if the lawyer should have known but for some reason claims not to
have known of the falsity. 48 Therefore, it is not really fair to attorneys to
42. See David S. Caudill, Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is there
an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 341 (2003).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002).
44. Id. R. 3.3. The indirect language persists in comment 8, which states that reasonable belief in
falsity “does not preclude” presentation—the drafters refuse to say “It can be presented!”
45. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 8 & R. 1.0(f).
46. Virginia Code Comm., Formal Op. 1650 (1995).
47. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.3:401 (2nd ed. Supp. 1992) (“If the lawyer’s
uncertainty is genuine and reasonable, he can present the evidence without risk of violating Rule
3.3.”).
48. See Caudill, supra note 42, at 344–48. For example, in Harre v. A.H. Robbins Co., 750 F.2d
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interpret the current rule as allowing attorneys to present all kinds of shaky
evidence without regard to its potential falsity—it cannot be presented if the
attorneys knows it is false or if a reasonable attorney would know it is false,
or if the attorney’s doubts about its falsity are not genuine and reasonable.
Professor Michael Saks, nearly a decade ago and in the context of a
symposium focused on the problem of unreliable criminal forensics, argued
in favor of an attorney’s duty to evaluate proffered scientific expertise; it
appeared to Saks that under the current rule, “ignorance is bliss for both the
proffered expert and the attorney . . . indeed the attorney would be rewarded
for not going to the trouble to learn about the expertise.” 49 This raises the
possibility of a fourth exception, expressed as a duty of due diligence and
reasonable inquiry when, for example, an attorney has doubts about the
truthfulness of a client’s testimony. 50 There is precedent for such a duty in
cases involving the obligation to reveal client fraud on the court. 51 But the
question is whether a client’s false testimony (when the client knows the
truth is otherwise, and the attorney could find the truth with some effort) is
analogous to inadmissible scientific testimony. For example, if a client in an
immigration case proposed to testify that she came to the United States on a
particular date, and her attorney doubts that the testimony is true, what
ethical obligations arise? If the attorney confronts the client who admits the
testimony is not true, such that the attorney knows of the falsehood, then the
testimony cannot be ethically presented; if a reasonable inquiry into the
client’s file or governmental records could confirm the falsehood, then the
attorney should have known or will be deemed to know of the falsehood, and
the testimony likewise cannot be ethically presented. 52 It is the assumed
analogy between (i) confirming the falsehood in client files or governmental
records and (ii) confirming the falsehood of the testimony of a scientific
expert by a reasonable inquiry into “science” that supports the notion that
expert testimony should not be presented if a reasonable inquiry into the
1501 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated in part by 866 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1989), an expert testified
contradictorily in two cases, and thus the expert’s counsel (the same attorney in both cases) “knew or
should have known of the falsity of the testimony.” 750 F.2d at 1503. In McNeill v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Tex. 1995), a railroad employee, who had won a
verdict for permanent disability based on the testimony of medical experts, filed a discrimination
action because his employer would not re-hire him; his attorney was deemed to have known about
his obvious fraud. 878 F. Supp. at 990–91.
49. Saks, supra note 38, at 427. I will return to and criticize this compelling argument and its
obvious appeal in Section III of this Article.
50. See Virginia Code Comm., Formal Op. 1087 (1992).
51. See id. Under the Virginia code, it is improper for attorney to take client’s representations at
face value if, “in the exercise of due diligence upon reasonable inquiry . . . the attorney should know
of information to the contrary.” Id.
52. Id.
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scientific literature would confirm its invalidity. Again, in the context of a
discussion about the lack of empirical support for many fields of forensic
science, the analogy tends to work quite well.
Saks’s argument at the symposium, therefore, seemed eminently
reasonable: Attorneys should be “obligated to acquire a good faith basis for
believing . . . that . . . proffered expertise is valid.” 53 Validity, in the
language of Daubert, is a requirement for admissibility and simply means, as
Saks explained, that purportedly scientific evidence has a foundation in
scientific methodology and data; it does not mean “true” or “correct” or that
inconsistent expertise will not also be admissible. 54 Model Rule 3.1 already
requires that a “lawyer shall not . . . assert an issue [in a proceeding] unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,” 55 and
Comment 2 states that lawyers are to “inform themselves about the facts of
their client’s cases . . . and determine that they can make good faith
arguments in support of their client’s positions.” 56 This current rule seems
to support an obligation to vet experts. However, an “action is not frivolous
even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will not
prevail,” 57 which means that Saks’s “good faith basis for believing” might
be a stronger formulation. 58 Indeed, Saks defined “good faith belief” as
being able to (i) make a “well-grounded showing” that proffered evidence
satisfies relevant admissibility (i.e., validity) criteria and (ii) “reach a
considered judgment that it is valid and . . . make a sound case . . . that it
ought to be admitted.” 59 Here, Saks began to veer away from existing
ethical guidelines, not with respect to the ability to make a well-grounded
showing or a sound case in good faith, but with the “considered judgment
that it is valid.” 60
Lawyers are currently permitted to proffer expertise that they reasonably
believe is false, as long as they do not know it is false, because they “are not
required to present an impartial exposition . . . or to vouch for the evidence
submitted . . . .” 61 Saks wanted lawyers to “defend [their expert’s] claims of
validity to themselves,” 62 phraseology which suggests that Saks did not
simply mean admissibility when he used the term “valid;” in Saks’s
example, handwriting examiners betray a “personal faith in the validity of
what they do” even after “the field’s weaknesses [i.e., no valid scientific

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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Saks, supra note 38, at 426.
See id. at 422; infra note 79.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
Id.
See Saks, supra note 38, at 426.
Id. at 428–29.
Id. at 429.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2002).
See Saks, supra note 38, at 429.
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basis] have been exposed and judged.” 63 The handwriting examiner in
Saks’s example presumably has faith in his field’s accuracy or correctness,
not in its admissibility. 64 For Saks, it was not difficult to “look below the
surface” and see such testimony as “false or misleading.” 65 Saks was not
discussing “shaky” evidence that might be admissible, proffered in good
faith by an attorney who doubts that it is true or even admissible; instead, he
was discussing misleading testimony—handwriting expertise that has not
been subjected to sufficient testing to establish its reliability. 66 Even though
a “lawyer should not conclude that testimony is . . . false unless there is a
firm factual basis for doing so,” 67 the “firm factual” basis was clear in
Saks’s example. 68 In short, while the conventional categories in the ethics
of proffering expertise include (1) known falsity (unethical to proffer), (2)
reasonable doubt about falsity (ethical to proffer), and (3) confidence in
one’s expert (ethical to proffer), 69 Saks’s example shifted the categories to
(1) known falsity (unethical to proffer), (2) lazy failure to investigate
validity (unethical to proffer), and (3) confidence in one’s expert (ethical to
proffer but irrelevant with respect to handwriting expertise). 70
I do not mean to downplay or minimize the frequency of examples like
the one Saks used because many of the fields of forensic science have been
shown to have little or no empirical support. 71 Moreover, it does not seem
fair to criticize Saks for proposing to somehow police the misuse of forensic
“science” in criminal contexts, which was clearly Saks’s focus (although he
expanded his proposal to include, and offered an example from, the civil
side of litigation). 72 However, I fear the current focus on the weaknesses of
many fields of criminal forensics tends to eclipse the problems of discerning
the reliability of many other forms of scientific expertise. 73

63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 427 n.22, 428–29.
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. c (2000).
68. See Saks, supra note 38, at 428–29.
69. See supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text.
70. See Saks, supra note 38, at 428–29; supra notes 53, 58–68 and accompanying text.
71. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 310, 313 (2006) (“[M]any
forensic techniques achieved judicial acceptance before the demanding Daubert standards were
operative. Consequently, empirical support for many techniques is often lacking . . . .”).
72. See Sacks supra, note 38, at 427.
73. See, e.g., Edmond, supra note 15, at 33 (“[P]laintiffs, like criminal defendants, are not always
in a position to produce demonstrably reliable expert evidence. Plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation, for
example, rarely have the foresight to sponsor prospective epidemiological studies before they
become ill.”).
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B. The Crisis in Criminal Forensics
Even prior to the release of the National Academies of Science report on
the weaknesses of forensic science in the criminal law context, 74 ethical
concerns had been raised regarding the obligations of prosecutors with
respect to dishonest experts. 75 Professor Myrna Raeder highlighted the
question of “whether [a forensic] expert’s pattern of finding questionable
results should put the prosecutor on notice of the likely falsity of the
evidence,” and concluded that
willful blindness should not provide an ethical pass. However, I do
not believe that the current language of the rules satisfactorily
covers this type of misconduct. Therefore, the rules or standards
should be modified to provide that a clear pattern of inaccurate
laboratory results is adequate to supply knowledge that the
testimony in an individual case is likely to be false or misleading. 76
Professor Jane Moriarty, on the other hand, did find in the ethical rules a
foundation for requiring that prosecutors, but not litigators on the civil side,
vet their experts for reliability because of the unique responsibility
prosecutors have as ministers of justice, not mere advocates. 77 However,
like Raeder, Moriarty saw a need for revisions to the rules to confirm a
prosecutorial duty to present only reliable evidence. 78 Recognizing the
problem of defining “unreliability,” Moriarty suggests that the standard be
“a factual basis to believe that the proposed evidence is incorrect, inaccurate,
incomplete, misleading, substantially flawed, or without solid foundation.” 79
Despite the appeal of such proposals, the examples of weak forensic
science seem to join with an assumption that the reliability of proffered
scientific expertise is, with some effort, discoverable. Using examples such
as visual hair comparison or bite mark evidence, which are easily challenged
as unreliable, 80 the assumption can be justified. However, reliability has
74. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) (calling into question the validity of many forensic
science disciplines); Jules Epstein, The NAS Report: An Evidence Professor’s Perspective, IT’S
EVIDENT, July 2009, http://www.ncstl.org/evident/July,%202009%20Epstein%20SPOTLIGHT (“[T]he
Report’s findings call into question the degree of certainty testified to by practitioners of ‘soft’ forensic
disciplines, the subjective pattern matching of fingerprints, ballistics, handwriting, tool marks, and
tire and shoe print treads. In particular, the Report found an across-the-board inability to validate
claims that a correspondence of features between crime scene evidence and a known (e.g., between a
latent print left at a burglary and the print of a suspect) proves that the suspect was the sole possible
contributor.”).
75. See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
76. Raeder, supra note 23, at 1439.
77. See Moriarty, supra note 23, at 21–24.
78. Id. at 28.
79. Id. at 29.
80. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
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proven to be a significant problem in the post-Daubert debate over
admissibility, and that problem should not be ignored.
The problem regarding reliability is not simply that attorneys (usually)
are not trained in science, because judges (usually) are not either. Judges
need to make reliability determinations, so why not lawyers? Rather, the
problem is that the role of a judge is to evaluate reliability after hearing
arguments from both sides in a pre-trial hearing. The role of a lawyer, on
the other hand, is to be a zealous and partisan advocate. To require a
decision on scientific correctness presumes that (1) such a decision is
unproblematic (as it is in the context of many fields of forensic science) and
(2) that such a decision is desirable for an advocate. The first presumption
involves a mistaken picture of science while the second involves a mistaken
picture of law practice.
III. PICTURING SCIENCE
Under current structures, where experts are chosen by the parties,
efforts to impose an obligation on lawyers to do more to vet their
experts seems both unwise and unrealistic.
Joseph Sanders 81
In response to Michael Saks’s suggestion that an attorney should be
ethically “obligated to acquire a good faith basis for believing . . . that [the]
proffered expertise is valid,” 82 Professor Joseph Sanders raised a compelling
(even to Saks) and pragmatic concern: How would bad faith be determined
without expending “substantial resources with limited returns beyond what
can already be achieved through admissibility rulings”? 83 By framing his
objection in such terms, I think Sanders eclipsed another aspect of the
problem with Saks’s proposal: What is “a good faith basis for believing” in
the validity of one’s expert testimony in cases involving complex scientific

Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 47–63, 67–71 (2009) (discussing hair comparison and bite
mark analysis).
81. Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1564 (2007).
82. Saks, supra note 38, at 426.
83. Sanders, supra note 81, at 1563–64. Saks, however, now agrees with Sanders that the ethical
rule he proposed a decade ago would be unworkable because it would be both redundant (regarding
Daubert) and pointless. Email from Michael J. Saks, Professor of Law and Psychology, Sandra Day
O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, to David S. Caudill, Professor and Arthur M.
Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova University School of Law (Aug. 1, 2010) (on file with
author).
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testimony? 84
Due to his focus on criminal forensics, Saks presumed that figuring out
the scientific validity of an expert’s testimony is a fairly straightforward
process, stating the following:
Any attorney, like any intelligent citizen, who takes the time and
effort to research a purported scientific subject has the potential to
reach her own conclusions about whether or not the field’s beliefs
rest on a foundation of data and logic that is solid, soft, mushy, or
non-existent. It is hard to think of principled reasons why an
attorney should not be obligated to acquire a good faith basis for
believing . . . that the proffered expertise is valid . . . as a
precondition for ethically offering such expert evidence to a court. 85
In another formulation, Saks rhetorically asked: Does an “attorney have
an obligation to first find out enough about the underlying science claims to
have a good faith belief that what is being offered to the court is
valid . . . ?” 86 Relying on one’s expert’s assertions cannot be sufficient
because, if it was, “lawyers could properly offer astrologers to courts.” 87
According to Saks,
If what is ethically required is a reasonable good faith belief, it
seems inescapable that the attorney could not use a shortcut or
proxy test, but would have to at least ask herself: Do I know enough
about this subject so that if it were challenged under Daubert I
could make a well-grounded showing that, at least on current
knowledge, it satisfies the relevant validity criteria? 88
Following Daubert, Saks conflated validity and admissibility in a Daubert
hearing, implying that unless attorneys are required to reach “a considered
judgment that [evidence] is valid and . . . can make a sound case to a court
that it ought to be admitted,” then it would be ethical for lawyers to make
“claims of validity to themselves or to courts with . . . the flimsiest of
scientific support or none at all.” 89
84. Regarding the question of when bad faith exists, Sanders, explicating Saks, offered the
following example:
[A] plaintiff’s treating physician [who] firmly believe[s] that his patient’s cancer was
caused by the defendant’s chemical even in the face of a body of epidemiologic and
animal study evidence indicating no relationship between exposure and this disease . . . .
[O]n these facts an attorney would be acting in bad faith if he put the witness on the
stand.
Id. at 1563.
85. Saks, supra note 38, at 426.
86. Id. at 427.
87. Id. at 428.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 429. In Daubert, validity is required for admissibility; “proposed testimony must be
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My concern is that this proposition implies a picture of science where
some amount of time and effort on the part of an attorney will result in an
adequate judgment of validity.
A. Background Controversies
When agreement about what constitutes scientific knowledge can
range so widely that even long-held ideas are challenged, it is not
easy to come up with a workable alternative to the Frye [general
acceptance] test, which requires the judge to be an arbiter of the
views of practicing scientists. Trying to decide which expert is
reasoning properly seems a rather difficult task for a court, when
even scientists often disagree on how to do it.
Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger 90
The picture of science in which the proposal for an ethical obligation to
vet experts is rooted was the subject of two controversies that arose in the
wake of Daubert: (1) the question of whether Daubert really provided a
reliability standard that supplanted Frye, and (2) whether Daubert should be
recognized as having unwittingly established a particular cultural vision of
science.
As to the controversy concerning the Frye general acceptance test, the
legal discourse immediately following Daubert emphasized that Daubert
replaced Frye “with a new standard that places a premium on scientific
validity and reliability.” 91 That is, judges are required “to scrutinize
scientific studies and evidence” and “to screen evidence for conformance to
the scientific method and accepted scientific practice.” 92 This framework
supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). There also must be a “valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility” because “scientific validity for
one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.” Id. at 591–92.
However, “there are no certainties in science,” as science “‘represents a process for proposing and
refining theoretical explanations . . . subject to further testimony and refinement.’” Id. (quoting Brief
for Am. Assoc. for the Advancement of Sci. and Nat’l. Acad. Sci. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 7–8, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (No. 92-102),
1993 WL 13006281). Therefore, validity is not truth or certainty, but “must be derived by the
scientific method” to be reliable and admissible. Id.
90. Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The
Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 335 (2001).
91. Edward W. Kirson, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Active Judicial Scrutiny of
Scientific Evidence, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J., no. 2, 1995 at 213, 213.
92. Id.
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suggests that judges do not defer to the views generally accepted by
scientists but instead stand in judgment over scientific experts, evaluating
their testimony for its “reliability.” However, as Paul Rice argued,
The reality is that judges are compelled to return to the same
relevant scientific communities for answers. Daubert is little more
than Frye in drag. Judges simply retool Frye by anointing a single
expert and substituting that expert’s opinions for those of the
relevant scientific community. The only difference is that the judge
lays out the criticism and concerns of the expert as if they were the
judge’s own . . . . 93
According to Gary Edmond, a Frye-type general acceptance standard was
inevitable once Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 94 confirmed “the absence of
universal features underlying the production of all forms of expertise.” 95
Proffers of expertise “have to be assessed against some meaningful standard.
Presumably, . . . the field or discipline from which the expert originates will
usually provide the appropriate indicators. This means . . . the Daubert
criteria . . . must always be applied via some version of the (general)
‘acceptance’ test.” 96 Rather than replacing acceptance with a reliability
standard, reliability “is indexed to the specific standard of acceptance
required.” 97 Reliability, that is,
will depend upon whether the jurisdiction requires near universal
acceptance, general acceptance or the acceptance of a distinguished
or substantial minority in a field. All proffers of expertise, then,
inescapably require some image of the field and some sense of the
degree of acceptance, invariably linked to the requisite level of
reliability. 98
Numerous other questions have been raised concerning how
revolutionary Daubert really was, including the intense attention given to
admissibility standards in the decades before Daubert, 99 as well as the
observation that admissibility determinations are often quite similar in Frye

93. Paul Rice, Truth in Test Tubes: Standard for Screening Scientific Evidence is Still Muddled
Years After Daubert, LEGAL TIMES, Oct 16, 2000, at 85, available at 2000 WLNR 10521423.
94. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
95. Gary Edmond, Deflating Daubert: Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael and the Inevitability of
General Acceptance (Frye), 23 U.N.S.W. L.J., no. 1, 2000 at 38, 53 (discussing Kumho Tire).
96. Edmond, supra note 95, at 53–54.
97. Id. at 54.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: AN EXPLORATORY
DISCUSSION (D. Nyhart ed., 1981) (proceedings of a 1977 conference anticipating the turn toward
more active judicial gatekeeping with respect to expert scientific testimony).
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and Daubert jurisdictions. 100
For my purposes, the notion that courts under Daubert do not defer to
the scientific community is related to a vision of science as an accessible
“catalog of truths” rather than “a contentious process.” The former tends to
demand “more of individual scientists and engineers than is expected of
them in their own research and practice.” 101 This vision can be called the
“Science as Logical Reasoning” school of thought, identified by Beyea and
Berger as comporting “with the popular concept of a scientist doggedly
collecting irrefutable facts, step by step, and placing them in logical order.
Lay judges are most likely to approach science with this ideal in mind,
requiring scientists to make generalizations from observations or data to
general laws of nature.” 102 Scientific knowledge, according to this view,
“exists as chunks of data bound together by logical propositions that can be
identified objectively.” 103
By contrast, the “Science as Process” school of thought, associated with
Popper and Kuhn, includes logic alongside “intuition, conjecture, inference,
professional judgment, and repeated testing” as features of science. 104 This
view also acknowledges the subjective elements involved in each step of the
production of scientific knowledge. 105 Both schools of thought, however,
find support in Daubert.
Those who read Daubert as having institutionalized the view that
science is characterized by logical reasoning can appeal either to scientific
consensus as the marker of reliability or to the ease by which the
characteristics of valid scientific knowledge and reasoning may be

100. See, e.g., Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1579, 1580–81, 1619 (2003) (variation in treatment of scientific evidence “does not correlate
with the adherence to Frye or Daubert admissibility standards”); David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye,
Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS 385, 388,
393 (finding that Frye is converging with Daubert and courts in Frye jurisdictions are beginning to
scrutinize expert methodology and reasoning); see also MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH
DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCE LITIGATION 311 (1996) (“[P]ost-Daubert
toxic substances decisions look very much like those that were decided before it, save for empty
obeisance to Daubert.”).
101. See Beyea & Berger, supra note 90, at 328.
102. Id. at 330. The authors associate this view of science with John von Neumann, who
seemed to regard the empirical world, probably even life and mind, as comprehensible in
terms of abstract formal structure. . . . He seems to fall under that tradition of Western
thought in which it is believed that only rigorous logic will ever succeed in containing the
timeless, universal truths that govern everything.
Id. at 330 n.15 (quoting STEVE J. HEIMS, JOHN VON NEUMANN AND NORBERT WIENER: FROM
MATHEMATICS TO THE TECHNOLOGIES OF LIFE AND DEATH 129–30 (1980)).
103. Id. at 330.
104. See id. at 331–32.
105. See id. at 332.
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grasped. 106 However, consensus “on what constitutes scientific knowledge
ranges from the near-universal to the hotly contested.” 107 Moreover,
“scientists can have vastly different opinions, even contradictory ones, and
still be legitimate parts of the [complex] network [of interacting
scientists] . . . . Criticism of scientist by scientist is not uncommon . . . .
When two scientists criticize each other in the courtroom, it does not mean
that one must be wrong.” 108
Just as judges are operating under an idealized vision of science when
they assume that disagreement among experts means one must be lying, I
argue below that attorneys should not presume to pre-judge their own
expertise in complex scientific disputes.
B. Questionable Assumptions
In [toxic tort] suits there is often considerable uncertainty, dispute,
and controversy concerning the factual conclusions at issue. In
many cases . . . it may be unclear whether toxic substances cause
cancer in human beings. Thus, there may be no well-established
consensus against which to measure the scientific validity of a
particular legal judgment.
Carl F. Cranor 109
The foregoing remark was a challenge to Bert Black’s selection of Wells
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 110 in which the verdict “ignored a wellestablished scientific consensus,” to bolster his argument that courts should
hold experts to scientific standards of evidence. 111 Professor Carl Cranor
notes that “the class of examples where a . . . decision . . . is contrary to
widely held views in the scientific community is easily distinguishable from
other cases in which the outcome depends upon a ‘battle of bona fide
106. See id. at 334; see also Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX L. REV. 715, 753 (1994).
107. Beyea & Berger, supra note 90, at 338. Beyea and Berger are critical of Bert Black and his
co-authors’ reliance on consensus because they give no “examples where there might not be a
consensus.” Id. at 334; see also Haack, supra note 10, at 10–11 (“[T]here are no rules determining
when a scientific claim is well enough warranted by the evidence to be accepted . . . .”).
108. Beyea & Berger, supra note 90, at 338, 340. The authors are critical of Bert Black and his
co-authors’ view that “the characteristics of valid scientific knowledge and the kind of reasoning that
produce it are not difficult to grasp.” Id. at 335–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Black et al., supra note 106, at 753). “If this is so easy, one wonders why the recognition of invalid
science cannot be left up to juries.” Id. at 336.
109. CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE
LAW 62 (1993).
110. 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir. 1986)
111. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 62 (discussing Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific
Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 672–74 (1988)).

694

[Vol. 38: 675, 2011]

Lawyers Judging Experts
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

experts.’” 112 Without regard to the debate over judicial admissibility
standards, the tendency to select easy cases persists in recommendations for
an ethical duty on the part of lawyers to vet their proffered expertise.
Forensic science horror stories, 113 and “the wave of DNA exonerations”
where “forensic science has played a large part in those erroneous
convictions,” 114 offer compelling examples. On the civil side, the example
of proffering a physician who believes and testifies that a chemical caused
cancer, “even in the face of [contrary] epidemiologic and animal study
evidence,” can also be offered in the abstract as a case of unethical
conduct. 115 There seems to be an assumption that we, and the attorney,
simply know that the physician’s testimony is wrong. However, Cranor
explains:
Epidemiological studies . . . may provide the best evidence that [a]
substance is carcinogenic . . . . Whether they do . . . depends upon
whether they suffer some possible practical and theoretical
difficulties. Practical evidence-gathering problems such as poor
recordkeeping, job mobility (for work place studies), and exposure
to more than one toxin may frustrate good studies. And long
latency periods for diseases typically caused by carcinogens make it
difficult to conduct well-done, reliable studies. [And] even if none
of these problems exist, theoretical considerations indicate that in
many circumstances the design and interpretation of such statistical
studies . . . [create] the possibility that risks of concern may go
undetected, because the power of the test may be quite low . . . . 116
Epidemiologists make trade-offs in terms of costs, sample sizes,
avoidance of false positives, and relative risk; moreover, “the same tradeoffs may be forced in animal studies . . . .” 117 None of which is to say that
epidemiologic studies are unreliable, but only that there are limitations:
“[M]ost studies have flaws. Some flaws are inevitable given the limits of
technology and resources. In evaluating epidemiologic evidence, the key
questions . . . are the extent to which a study’s flaws can be assessed and

112. Id.
113. See Raeder, supra note 23, at 1420–21 (“[P]rosecutors should be on the lookout for
inaccurate or misleading testimony when offering an expert who presents statistics without scientific
basis or relies on questionabl[e] . . . techniques, such as hair or bite mark analysis.”).
114. Saks, supra note 38, at 423 See generally Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 80.
115. See Sanders, supra note 81, at 1563.
116. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 29, 40.
117. Id. at 36.

695

taken into account in making inferences.” 118
That is why in the example above involving a physician claiming
causation in the face of contrary epidemiologic and animal study evidence, a
question arises as to whether the plaintiff’s attorney is ethically required to
interpret that contrary evidence as conclusive. If the example were to be
modified to include numerous well-designed and powerful epidemiological,
animal, and in vitro studies contradicting the plaintiff’s claim, such that the
only evidence supporting the physician’s claim was temporal order, I would
concede that plaintiff’s counsel should, even under current ethical rules,
question whether there is a “basis in law and fact . . . that is not frivolous.” 119
Saks’s specific examples were a sincere physician willing to testify to
causation when no grounds exist and an expert who is willing to testify to a
fact that no scientist would accept. 120 In those cases, Saks suggested, the
attorney should “find out enough about the underlying science claims” to
determine, or at least reach a good faith belief in, the validity of the expert’s
testimony. 121 That sounds reasonable, given the extreme hypotheticals and
the current ethical framework requiring good faith arguments, 122 but many
cases will likely not be so easy—what if there are minimal or shaky grounds
(i.e., not “no grounds,” but also not strong grounds) for the physician’s
testimony, or what if the expert in the second example finds a few scientists
who would accept his fact? 123 An attorney faced with such an expert should,
Saks seemingly suggested, do some research and make a decision on validity
and admissibility in advance of the Daubert hearing or trial. 124
Steven Lubet, in answer to the question of when an attorney has “a
reasonable belief as to the admissibility of evidence,” replies that such a
“determination lies within the thought processes of the individual lawyer.” 125
That answer suggests that an ethical obligation to vet an expert would be
unworkable, but the “good faith” standard in legal ethics, applied, for

118. Michael Green, D. Michael Freedman, & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 337 (2d ed. 2000).
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
120. See Saks, supra note 38, at 427.
121. Id.
122. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2002).
123. See, e.g., Searles v. Fleetwood Homes of Pennsylvania, Inc., 878 A.2d 509 (Me. 2005). In
Searles, the admission of a physician’s testimony (that plaintiffs’ respiratory problems were caused
by volatile organic compounds [VOCs] from mold) was challenged because it was not supported by
“peer-reviewed, scientifically verified, and generally accepted studies . . . .” 878 A.2d at 515. The
court noted, however, that
[e]ven if the proposition that fungal VOCs can cause an irritant reaction of the type
experienced by the [plaintiffs] has not gained general acceptance, Dr. Upham’s testimony
and [several] journal articles . . . indicate that the proposition cannot be discounted as the
marginal view of a handful of members of the relevant scientific community.
Id. at 517–18.
124. See Saks, supra note 38, at 427.
125. STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 295 (3d ed. 2004).
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example, to the permission to make a good faith argument challenging
existing law, is an objective standard—in other words, would a reasonable
attorney have that belief? 126
At this point, the proposal to require attorneys to vet their proffered
expertise becomes unworkable due to the nature of science. One can
imagine a disciplinary hearing wherein an attorney, who had proffered shaky
scientific evidence, is accused of failing to attain a good faith belief in the
validity of her expert’s testimony. By framing his ethical concern in terms
of validity, Saks’s proposal would mean that the evidence in the hearing will
be scientific evidence, and one starts to sympathize with Sanders’ pragmatic
concern that this enterprise would accomplish little more than an
admissibility hearing already does (with the added feature that not only will
an expert be rejected, but an ethical complaint against the proffering attorney
may follow). 127 Indeed, Saks unwittingly imported all of the controversies
over admissibility into the realm of ethics—appellate judges often disagree
with trial judges about validity, 128 and thus the question of whether the
accused attorney’s belief was reasonable is not answerable by reference to a
stable body of knowledge. Scientific experts at trial also disagree, each side
typically claiming to have followed the accepted scientific method. Thus, to
presume stability by simply consulting the scientific literature is also
unrealistic. The ethical rule only works if science is an uncontroversial
field.
In any event, the accused attorney would need to show a good faith
belief in the validity, or likely admissibility, of her expert’s testimony, after
familiarizing herself with the scientific literature in the field. Other
attorneys, and presumably scientists, could argue at the disciplinary hearing
that no reasonable attorney, and no reasonable scientist, would have reached
the same conclusion. Saks offered the example of the handwriting expert in
United States v. McVeigh, 129 who was not proffered because the U.S.
Attorney did not think that such expertise would be admitted under
Many scientific disputes, presumably, would be more
Daubert. 130
complicated, and the potential arises, as Sanders warned, for Daubert
hearings in disciplinary proceedings.
Significantly, the ethical rules already prohibit attorneys from asserting

126. See Bach v. McNeils, 207 Cal. Rptr. 232, 246 (Ct. App. 1989) (a suit is meritless only
“where any reasonable attorney would agree that the action is totally and completely without merit”
(quoting Finnie v. Town of Tiburon, 244 Cal. Rptr. 581, 587 (Ct. App. 1988)).
127. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
128. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 10, at 15–47.
129. 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
130. Saks, supra note 38, at 428 (citing U.S. v. McVeigh, 1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Trans.)).
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an “issue” in a “proceeding” “unless there is a basis in law and fact.” 131 The
disciplinary hearing described in the previous paragraph could therefore be
framed as concerning a non-meritorious contention. Comment 2 to Rule 3.1
requires that lawyers “inform themselves about the facts of their clients’
cases,” which would certainly include the scientific facts in the testimony of
expert witnesses. 132 Of course, lawyers may offer evidence as long as it is
not known to be false, but under Comment 8 to Rule 3.3, “A lawyer’s knowledge
that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances.” 133 I
think this is really what proponents of a duty to vet expertise have in mind—
lawyers should not present false testimony, and they should take the time to
figure out if their expertise is “false.” Once everyone knows that the current
technique of bite mark and hair analyses have no scientific basis and have
led to erroneous convictions, it is wrong to present such testimony as valid.
And the ethical rules already require a determination by a lawyer that “good
faith arguments” can be made “in support of their clients’ positions.” 134
The problem is that many uses of scientific testimony are not so simple.
Probabilities, uncertainties, conflicting theories that are both consistent with
the evidence, debates in scientific literature, and dynamic changes in almost
every field of science make it difficult for an attorney to identify, using
Moriarty’s definition (for imposing a higher duty on prosecutors), testimony
that is “incorrect, inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, substantially flawed,
Outside of forensic identification
or without solid foundation.” 135
techniques, questions about the strengths or weaknesses of particular
theories, data-collection techniques, and published studies become very

131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
132. Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
133. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 8.
134. Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
135. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Haack, supra note 10, at 9. Haack
suggests that, “[w]here all but the very simplest scientific claims and theories are concerned, the
evidence will ramify in all directions; . . . it is almost invariably incomplete; and it is quite often
ambiguous or misleading.” Id. at 9. Moreover, when “the available evidence on some scientific
question is seriously incomplete, [scientists] may reasonably disagree . . . .” Id. at 10.
As new evidence comes in, a consensus may eventually form . . . . But there are no rules
determining when a scientific claim is well enough warranted by the evidence to be
accepted . . . .
Ideally, such consensus would form when . . . the evidence is sufficient; in practice,
acceptance and warrant sometimes come apart. This may be . . . the result of the
influence or the persuasiveness of some individual or group in the field.
Id. at 10–11. Indeed, Haack remarks, “the law very often calls on those fields of science where the
pressure of commercial interests is most severe.” Id. at 15. And, “[b]ecause the legal system aspires
to resolve disputes promptly, the scientific questions to which it seeks answers will often be those
for which all the evidence is not yet in.” Id. at 16. As to relying on peer-reviewed publications as a
stable marker of reliability, Haack doubts “that many working scientists imagine that . . . publication
after peer review is any guarantee that [a work] is good stuff, or that its not having been published
necessarily undermines its value.” Id. at 19. Finally, “the core business of science is inquiry,” and it
is “by nature tentative and thoroughly fallibilist.” Id. at 12.
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complicated. 136 The lack of empirical support for bite mark and hair
analyses could well change, making even the evaluation of those forensic
identification techniques more complex and controversial, and in the field of
toxic torts, current knowledge and scientific evidence will certainly
change. 137 The debates over low-dose toxicity provide a good example—
some scientists arguing that the risk is small; others arguing that the risk is
large; and both sides basing their views on newer and better epidemiologic
and animal studies. 138
C. Going Beyond the Easy Case(s)
To be clear, Saks’s example of an easy case of inadmissible (or
“invalid”) evidence assumed a physician with a sincere belief that “his
patient’s cancer is caused by a chemical made by the defendant,” but where
“no scientific research has ever been conducted.” 139 The physician might
think, “When it is conducted I am sure it will bear out my faith and my
intuition.” 140 Sanders, paraphrasing Saks, added to the hypothetical,
presumably to make an even easier case, imagining that the physician is
faced with “epidemiological and animal study evidence indicating no”
causal relationship. 141 In Saks’s hypothetical, the physician had no grounds
from either “science” or “scientific literature” on which to base his sincere
belief. 142 Of course, if the physician was drawing on clinical experience,
and perhaps a differential diagnosis, the example differs from one in which
136. See, e.g., Athina Tatsioni, Nikolaus G. Bonitsis, & John P.A. Ioannidis, Persistence of
Contradicted Claims in the Literature, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2517, 2517 (2010) (“Some research
findings that have received wide attention in the scientific community, as proven by high citation
counts of the respective articles, are eventually contradicted by subsequent evidence.”); see also
David Goodstein, Fed. Judicial Ctr., How Science Works, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 13 (2d ed., 2000) (distinguishing between textbook science and the frontiers of science
(where theories are vulnerable)). See generally Christopher Onslott, Judicial Notice and the Law’s
“Scientific” Search for Truth, 40 AKRON L. REV. 465 (2007) (discussing the evolving nature of
scientific knowledge).
137. See Carl F. Cranor, Do You Want to Bet Your Children’s Health on Post-Market Harm
Principles? An Argument for a Trespass or Permission Model for Regulating Toxicants, 19 VILL.
ENVTL. L. J. 251, 270, 311–12 (2008).
138. See generally id. at 270 (arguing that the risk of low-dose toxicity is great; however, “there
are gaps in the science”). But see Michael Gough & Steven Milloy, The Case For Public Access to
Federally Funded Research Data, POLICY ANALYSIS, No. 366, Feb 2, 2000, at 5–8, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa366.pdf (describing “panic” over endocrine disruptors and how the
National Research Council “declared that the endocrine disruptor hypothesis was ‘rife with
uncertainty’ and . . . without clinical or experimental support”).
139. Saks, supra note 38, at 427.
140. Id. at 427 n.21.
141. Sanders, supra note 81, at 1563.
142. Saks, supra note 38, at 427.
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the physician has an intuition wholly unrelated to his clinical background.
Because Saks seemed to be implying the latter, my only criticism is that he
chose an extreme hypothetical to support a broad rule requiring lawyers to
vet proffered expert testimony—how often do physicians selected to testify
have no basis at all for their conclusion? When the grounds for a
physician’s testimony are merely weak (but not non-existent), the situation
may be one “of strong scientific uncertainty—a phrase . . . [denoting]
situations in which a qualified expert proposes to testify on an issue that hard
science can resolve, but upon which substantial scientific study has yet to be
done . . . .’ 143
In those cases, it can be argued that a physician’s testimony (based on
examination and the medical history of the plaintiff, the physician’s
experience, and differential diagnosis) that exposure to a toxic substance
caused the plaintiff’s injury, even in the absence of “rigorous scientific
evidence,” should be admitted “when differential diagnosis has eliminated
enough alternative causes to produce relevant and reliable conclusions.” 144
As to epidemiologic evidence indicating no causal relationship,
Sanders’s addition to the easy case hypothetical, there is now a critical
discourse on both the limitations of epidemiologic evidence and judicial
handling of such evidence. For example, Carl Cranor identifies the
unfortunate possibility that “judges may take ‘no effect’ epidemiological
studies at face value and conclude that [such studies demonstrate] that
exposure does not cause the disease.” 145
If plaintiffs have offered some evidence of an effect based on other
kinds of studies, simply because defendants have no evidence of an
effect in particular epidemiological studies does not show there is
evidence of no effect; it should not trump plaintiffs’ evidence.
Defendants’ evidence could trump plaintiffs’ other evidence . . .
only if . . . there was evidence of no effect from human studies and
it . . . overwhelmed plaintiffs’ evidence . . . . However, this is an
extremely difficult showing to make. 146
Epidemiologist Sander Greenland shows how evidence of no causal
relationship—the testimony of an epidemiologist “that exposure [to the

143. Note, Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of Hard Science, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1467, 1468 (2000).
144. See id. at 1469, 1470 nn. 15 & 18, 1474. The author proposes a framework by which “a trial
judge might weigh the results of differential diagnosis, as well as the probative value of the temporal
proximity between alleged cause and effect.” Id. at 1470, see also id. at 1474–80 (describing the
framework). The framework is then applied to the Moore and Heller cases, concluding that the trial
court was arguably wrong in Moore, but right in Heller, to disallow differential diagnosis testimony.
See id. at 1481–84.
145. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 243.
146. Id. at 244–45.
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chemical] does not pose a risk of the disease”—can be misleadingly
constructed out of “no effect” studies. 147 Greenland refers to the testimony
of a cancer epidemiologist who explained to the court that risk evaluation
under the scientific method always begins with the null hypothesis (no
increased risk), and if no increase in the disease is observed, the null
hypothesis is accepted. 148 Greenland considers such testimony discredited
and states that “[i]nstead of maintaining a hypothesis until forced to give it
up, a good scientist should regard any hypothesis (including a null one) as
conjectural, seek and welcome refuting evidence, and willingly abandon the
hypothesis when faced with an alternative hypothesis that better explains or
fits the evidence.” 149
Greenland then criticizes the expert’s strong assertion on the grounds of
logic (“misrepresenting an expression of uncertainty . . . as support for a . . .
certain assertion favoring the defense” 150 ) and statistics (insignificance “of
the null hypothesis leaves open the possibility that there are hypotheses more
compatible with the data” 151 ), as well as failure to address the validity of
statistical assumptions, the cost of false negatives, and extant criticism of the
Greenland concludes that experts should be
expert’s viewpoint. 152
encouraged “to give a moderated perspective that shows grades of
confidence over the full range of possible effects” rather than to testify with
pretended certainty. 153
Andrew Jurs similarly highlights the limitations associated with
epidemiologic evidence in his study of judicial handling of complex
scientific testimony. 154 Jurs notes that the field of epidemiology not only
lacks “consensus among researchers,” but that courts use “epidemiologic
definitions beyond the scope of what researchers would do in the lab” and
have trouble with their “statistical language of risks and probabilities.” 155
Moreover, by creating bright line rules, such as the doubling-of-the-risk

147. Sander Greenland, The Need for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology and
Statistics, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 295 (2004).
148. See id.
149. Id. at 296.
150. See id. at 296–97 (“[L]ogically, ‘being uncertain’ not only means one cannot reject the [null]
hypothesis . . . ; it also means one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is an effect.”).
151. See id. at 297–301.
152. See id. at 301–07.
153. Id. at 309–10.
154. See Andrew W. Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex and Cutting Edge Science in the Daubert
Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 CONN. L. REV. 49
(2009).
155. Id. at 70, 73, 75 (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
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approach, 156 courts sacrifice “scientific validity at the altar of certainty . . .
[covering] the uncertainty inherent in . . . epidemiologic analysis with a
veneer of objectivity.” 157 Finally, the “acceptance of epidemiologic relative
risk as the sine qua non of causation in toxic torts is an example of the
science within the courtroom clearly diverting away from the mainstream
practice of science.” 158 In Cranor’s assessment, “[I]t is simply a mistake to
think that epidemiological studies are necessary for scientists to form
reasonable views about toxic effects in humans. Because of limited
evidence, consensus scientific bodies in fact frequently utilize various kinds
of nonepidemiological evidence in combination.” 159 Well-designed
epidemiological studies of sufficient duration, with large samples that are
sufficiently sensitive, are the most direct evidence of human harm, but
“various scientific problems, limitations, shortcomings, and weaknesses . . .
affect their usefulness, especially in toxic tort suits.” 160
My point is simply to problematize the supposed easy case where it
would be unethical to proffer the testimony of a physician in the face of
contrary epidemiologic and animal evidence. Of course, the hypothetical
could be refined by making the epidemiologic evidence nearly bullet-proof
and the physician’s testimony a mere hunch, but in a variation of Cranor’s
argument that excellent evidence makes bad law because courts might
expect that level of certainty in every case, 161 extreme examples of unethical
conduct may make bad ethical rules. As a general rule, I do not agree with
Saks that any attorney can, with some time and effort, reach a “good faith
basis for believing . . . that . . . proffered expertise is valid . . . as a
precondition for ethically offering” such evidence. 162 If scientists only
speak in terms of probability (degrees of certainty), 163 and if the opposing
experts in a case are credentialed scientists who disagree, why would a
lawyer be so presumptuous? Of course, a good faith belief in validity is not
absolute certainty and could simply represent a belief in admissibility in a
Daubert hearing. In other words, an attorney should pre-judge admissibility
before the judge has a chance to decide. The problem is that an attorney
may not know whether a proffered expert’s testimony is valid or invalid, or

156. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that relative risk above 2.0, where the chance of illness from exposure exceeds the background
chance of illness from all other causes, equals the “more likely than not” standard of preponderance
of the evidence).
157. Jurs, supra note 154, at 76.
158. Id. at 79.
159. CRANOR, supra note 109, at 224–25.
160. Id. at 225.
161. Id. at 157. Bendectin may be one of the best studied substances ever because “exposure
information was quite good, the studies were comparatively quick to conduct, and large groups of
exposed individuals were available.” Id at 202.
162. See Saks, supra note 38, at 426.
163. See generally Jurs, supra note 154, at 76.
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ultimately admissible, and Saks seemed to be suggesting that such testimony
should not be offered. The next question is whether that perspective is
consistent with the role of an advocate.

IV. THE LIMITS ON ADVOCACY, REVISITED
A competent lawyer will shop for experts with views favorable to the
lawyer’s case, and will attempt to deny use of unfavorable experts
by the opposing side (e.g., by attempted disqualification in pre-trial
maneuvers; by attempted impeachment in cross-examination; or by
retaining, but not naming or using, unfavorable experts, thus
denying them to the opposing side).
Sander Greenland 164
That “anthropological” observation by an epidemiologist who is
experienced in litigation 165 provides a basis for the argument that attorneys
should shoulder a large part of the blame for the perceived problem of junk
science in the courtroom. Indeed, in his recent proposal for “a new remedy
for the misconduct of knowing proffer of inadmissible evidence,” namely
allowing the opposing side to treat it as an admission of the weakness of
one’s case, Professor Imwinkelried seeks harsher punishment for attorney
misconduct. 166 Imwinkelried did not discuss known proffers of inadmissible
expert testimony, but he clearly views similar examples as wrongful.
Edward Cheng, in response to Imwinkelried, notes that the notion of “clear
inadmissibility” is “difficult to locate,” and Cheng would not identify
proffers of technically inadmissible evidence with “perjury, fabrication, and
spoliation.” 167 Those who seek to impose a duty on attorneys to vet proffers
of expert evidence seem to make the analogy between fabrication and
proffers of inadmissible evidence, and to imagine that locating clear
inadmissibility is not so difficult.
The proposed duty to vet expert evidence is difficult to construct under
the current Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.3 prohibits offering
164. Greenland, supra note 147, at 292.
165. Id. at 291.
166. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Poetic Justice in Punishing the Evidentiary Misdeed of Knowingly
Proffering Inadmissible Evidence, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, Issue 1, art. 6, 2009, at 1, 2,
http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol7/iss1/.
167. Edward K. Cheng, Response: Are Proffers of Inadmissible Evidence Wrongful?, 7 INT’L
COMMENT. EVIDENCE, Issue 1, art. 6, 2009, at 1, 2, http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol7/iss1/art7/.
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evidence known to be false; Comment 8 allows a lawyer to resolve doubts in
favor of one’s clients, but it warns that “the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious
falsehood.” 168 Lawyers are allowed to offer testimony reasonably believed
to be false and have an obligation to present their client’s case “with
persuasive force,” but they do not vouch for submitted evidence. 169
However, these rules are all qualified by the duty of candor toward the
tribunal and the warning that “the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be
misled by . . . evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” 170 At times, the
assumption on the part of those who seek a general duty to vet expertise
seems to be that the validity of scientific expertise is readily ascertainable,
with some time and effort, such that any attorney is going to know, or should
know, if the proffered evidence is false.
Prosecutors do have a special duty not to mislead the tribunal, 171 and
ABA prosecutor standards, like the Model Rules for all attorneys, prohibit
knowingly offering false evidence; the commentary warns that such falsity is
known if it “reasonably should have been discovered by” the prosecutor. 172
Then the language changes from the Model Rules, because the “mere offer
of known inadmissible evidence” is improper—Standard 3-5.6(b) prohibits
knowingly offering inadmissible evidence. 173 But because so much
unreliable forensic science has been admitted in criminal trials, the argument
for requiring prosecutors to vet their expertise for reliability is compelling.
The current rules can be summarized as follows: no attorney may offer
evidence known to be false; other than prosecutors, attorneys do not vouch
for their evidence and may even present testimony reasonably believed to be
false; and prosecutors have a higher duty to avoid offering evidence known
to be inadmissible. The proposal to require attorneys to vet their expertise
would impose the prosecutors’ higher duty on all lawyers and would
significantly alter the ability of lawyers to put on the best case possible for
their clients—by avoiding known false evidence but otherwise proffering, at
times, shaky evidence reasonably believed (but not known) to be false. Just
as the “duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict,” 174
the duty for all attorneys with respect to scientific expertise would be to seek
scientific validity, not merely to advocate for one’s client. Just as a
prosecutor has a “quasi-judicial position” to ensure justice in our adversary
system, 175 so should all attorneys, the argument goes, with respect to
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002).
169. Id. R. 3.3 cmts. 2 & 8.
170. Id. R. 3.3. cmt. 2. Rule 3.3 also notes that a lawyer may refer to other testimony reasonably
believed to be false. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
171. See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10:27 (2d ed. 2008).
172. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION,
Standard 3-5.6(a) cmt. (1993).
173. Id.
174. Id. Standard 3-1.2(c).
175. Id. Standard 3-1.2 cmt.
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scientific expertise. By contrast, under the Model Rules, “a lawyer can be a
zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that
justice is being done.” 176
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers offers an expanded
rationale for the lawyer’s role as an advocate: “Advocates are guided
primarily by the goal of advancing their individual clients’ interests . . . .
They are expected to marshal evidence and legal argument in support of
the positions of their respective clients . . . without personal
responsibility for the outcome of the proceeding.” 177
This statement appears at the outset of the “Limits on Advocacy”
topic, where the prohibition against frivolous advocacy, the duty to
disclose adverse legal authority, and the special rules of candor in ex
parte proceedings are also discussed. 178 Other limits on advocacy
discussed in the Restatement include compliance with law and limitations
on being a witness and on public comments, as well as the prohibition
against presenting false testimony or evidence. 179 Indeed, there are so
many limits on advocacy (e.g., prohibitions against influencing or
insulting a judge, contact with jurors, or destroying evidence) 180 that
another limitation on advocacy does not seem startling. However, if the
concern over lawyers introducing inadmissible or invalid scientific
evidence is a concern that the lawsuit is frivolous, that concern is already
addressed by the ethical rules. Beyond that, the suggestion that lawyers
should make a personal assessment of the validity of their expert’s
testimony seems to conflict with the advocate’s role. Lawyers are not
permitted, for example, to state their personal opinions about the justness
of a cause or credibility of a witness, 181 but they are allowed to “argue
any position or conclusion adequately supported by [their] analysis of the
evidence.” 182 The latter freedom comes with the “adequately supported”
limitation, but the Restatement’s commentary on the former limitation
notes that the rule

176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Pmbl. 8 (2002).
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch.7, topic 2, intro. note (2000).
178. See id. §§ 110–12.
179. See id. §§ 105, 108–09, 120.
180. See id. §§ 113–15, 118.
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2002); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107 (2000).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107(1) (2000). This rule could
be read as a duty to vet experts because if the evidence proffered must support a lawyer’s argument,
then the evidence must also be valid. Such a reading, however, would be in conflict with the
freedom to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes, but does not know, is false.
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is designed to prevent interjection of the lawyer’s own credibility
into the issues to be decided . . . . The rule also preserves the
advocate’s role as an independent professional agent. Permitting
advocates to make personal affirmations would by implication
disparage the causes of a client for whom the chosen advocate
could not conscientiously vouch, prejudicing the rights of those
with unpopular or difficult cases. 183
When you get to the rule against presenting false evidence, a “lawyer
should not conclude that testimony is or will be false unless there is a
firm factual basis for doing so.” 184 This is the opposite of the proposal to
require vetting of experts.
While the adversary system, wherein parties are responsible for and
in control of collecting and presenting evidence, 185 is not without its
critics, 186
the [traditional] reason for this arrangement lies in the belief that
each party, driven by self-interest and desire to win, will do the
best job of finding evidence and forming arguments in his favor.
[This implies that] each party is only responsible for his own
case and does not have the obligation to offer evidence or
advance arguments in favor of his opponent. 187
Lon Fuller famously described the importance and distinction in the
adversary system of the roles of the judge and jury (who are excluded
from partisanship), as opposed to the advocate’s role—“[h]is task is not
to decide but to persuade”; his (or her) viewpoint is not detached but
rather “from that corner of life into whom fate has cast his client.” 188
Arguments for each party “must be presented . . . with partisan zeal by
one not subject to the restraints of the judicial office.” 189 In another
formulation:
183. Id. § 107(1) cmt. b.
184. Id. § 120 cmt. c.
185. See KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 7 (2003).
186. See STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH
TO ADJUDICATION 51–67 (1988); see also HUANG, supra note 185, at 7–8 (the system is premised
on both sides having the same resources, which may not be true); id. at 17 (risk of attorney
manipulation of truth).
187. HUANG, supra note 185, at 7.
188. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 36 (Harold J. Berman
ed., 1973); see also DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE 3 (2008) (“Unlike juries and judges, adversary lawyers should not pursue a true
account of the facts of a case and promote a dispassionate application of law to these facts. Instead,
they should try aggressively to manipulate both the facts and the law to suit their clients’ purposes.
This requires lawyers to promote beliefs in others that they themselves (properly) reject as false.
Lawyers might, for example . . . make legal arguments that they would reject as judges.”).
189. Id.
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The adversary process assigns each participant a single function.
The judge is to serve as a neutral and passive arbiter. Counsel
are to act as zealous advocate . . . . Each knows what is expected
of them . . . . Among the greatest dangers . . . [is] that the
attorney will compromise his client’s interests if compelled to
serve as an officer of the court rather than as an advocate. 190
Failure to carry out that duty both impedes development of the case and
undermines the adversary process. The proposal for an ethical obligation to
vet expertise therefore represents a substantial shift in the attorney’s role
with respect to proffered expertise, from zealous advocate to a kind of
neutral, court-appointed scientific expert.
V. CONCLUSION
The reason that the proponents of the duty to vet expertise do not see
their proposal as a wholesale challenge to the lawyer-as-advocate model is
that, with respect to scientific expertise, they have simply eliminated the
category of evidence “reasonably believed to be false.” 191 If one wonders
whether an expert’s views are false, one should do the research necessary to
conclude either that it is false or that it is valid and therefore admissible.
This puts attorneys in the position of judging the validity of expertise,
although one need only reach a good faith belief in validity, not absolute
certainty. 192 But if Greenland is correct that “acknowledgement of
controversy and uncertainty is a hallmark of good science,” 193 this is not
always easy.
The real problem with the proposed duty to vet expertise is the
proposition that attorneys should come to a good faith belief in validity.
What if I am uncertain, that is, I am not really sure if my expert physician’s
opinion or the other side’s epidemiologic evidence is correct? Is that
uncertainty a failure to come to a good faith belief in validity or a justifiable
uncertainty arising out of a scientific controversy? One could tell me to go
back to the literature to settle the controversy. But the attorney’s role as an
advocate, notwithstanding its limitations in terms of duties of candor to the
court, should remain particularly distinct from the judge’s and jury’s role in
resolving such disputes. When Saks said that it “is hard to think of
principled reasons why an attorney should not be obligated to acquire a good

190.
191.
192.
193.

LANDSMAN, supra note 186, at 35.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2002).
See Saks, supra note 38, at 428.
Greenland, supra note 147, at 294.
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faith basis for believing” that proffered expertise is valid, 194 the reasons that
he missed were the complexity of a lot of courtroom expertise and the
advocate’s traditional role in our adversary system.

194. Saks, supra note 38, at 426.
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